Mr. Sacopulos is a regular contributor to The Horsemen’s Journal magazine. He is national counsel for the North American Association of Racetrack Veterinarians (NAARV) and has been and remains involved in the constitutional challenges to Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act (HISA) – the federal legislation governing thoroughbred racing.
One of those constitutional challenges is that HISA violates the constitutional rights guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a trial by jury. In his article, Mr. Sacopulos examines and analyzes the Petitioner’s, Philip Serpe’s, attempt to remove the claim against him to a federal trial court and to enjoin the administrative actions against him. Mr. Serpe’s efforts and challenge are based on his claim that HISA violates his Seventh Amendment rights. Mr. Serpe’s efforts and the court’s opinion provide valuable insight to future Covered Persons Seventh Amendment challenges.
Veteran Thoroughbred trainer Phil Serpe was charged by the Horseracing Integrity and Welfare Unit (HIWU) after his horse Fast Kimmie tested positive for clenbuterol following a race in August 2024.
After a confirmatory test and Serpe’s decision to contest the charge, HIWU imposed a provisional suspension in October 2024, though that suspension
was later lifted while proceedings continued. Serpe filed suit in federal court, challenging the enforcement structure of the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (HISA) as unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment. He also sought a preliminary injunction to halt the administrative proceedings and block further enforcement by HISA or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
SEVENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE AND PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Serpe’s primary constitutional claim at this stage was that HISA’s adjudicatory scheme violates his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury in suits at common law in which legal rights and remedies are at stake.
Serpe argued that despite HISA’s label of an administrative proceeding, the enforcement action against him is essentially a legal dispute seeking to impose civil penalties—the kind of relief that historically could only be imposed in a court of law before a jury. In support, Serpe leaned heavily on the recent case SEC v. Jarkesy,2 in which the Supreme Court held that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s in-house imposition of monetary penalties violated the Seventh Amendment.
HISA argued that Serpe’s Seventh Amendment claim fails under the public rights doctrine, which permits Congress to assign adjudication of certain regulatory matters to non-Article III bodies3 without a jury. Citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA,4 both HISA and the FTC maintained that HISA’s enforcement scheme (like historical horse racing regulation) falls within that exception.
For decades, entities like The Jockey Club and, later, state commissions imposed penalties through administrative mechanisms without jury involvement. Regulation of doping in horse racing, HISA and the FTC emphasized, is a public policy function distinct from private-law claims like fraud or breach of contract. Because HISA’s structure channels enforcement through statutorily created rights overseen by the FTC, they contended the process is constitutionally sound and does not trigger the Seventh Amendment’s jury guarantee.
HIWU’S FINE WAIVER AND THE COURT’S MOOTNESS ANALYSIS
After the April 2025 hearing on Serpe’s motion, HIWU submitted a declaration5 stating it would not pursue any monetary penalty against Serpe at arbitration. HISA quickly argued that this mooted the Seventh Amendment claim since only non-monetary sanctions remained and jury rights attach only to legal (not equitable) relief.6 But U.S. District Judge David Leibowitz rejected that argument under the voluntary cessation doctrine, which requires defendants to prove it is “absolutely clear” the challenged conduct will not recur. Because HIWU is a quasi-private entity, it did not benefit from the usual presumption of good faith afforded to government actors. The court found that HIWU’s strategic posturing mid-litigation failed to carry the “heavy burden” needed to establish mootness.
Specifically, the court found that: HIWU’s promise not to impose a fine was too vague and informal to constitute a clear termination of the challenged conduct, especially since it was unsupported by any binding rule change and left open the possibility that an arbitrator might still issue a penalty. Because HIWU made its no-fine declaration immediately after the court suggested it might moot the case, the court viewed it as a reactive strategic maneuver rather than a deliberate policy decision.
HIWU’s position applied only to Serpe and lacked any evidence of broader application or enduring policy, signaling to the court that this was a one-off exception rather than a consistent or reliable change in enforcement practice.
This holding kept Serpe’s motion for a preliminary injunction alive and allowed the court to address the merits of the claim.
THE COURT’S RATIONALE: AN UNRIPE CLAIM (FTC) AND NO IRREPARABLE HARM (HISA)
Despite the earlier win, Serpe’s request for an injunction against the FTC failed on ripeness grounds, finding that Serpe’s claims were not “ripe” or ready to be heard by the court because the FTC had not yet taken any action against him.
Under HISA’s structure, the FTC only becomes involved after arbitration concludes, and at the time of Serpe’s motion, it was still uncertain whether he would be sanctioned at all.
Leibowitz emphasized that courts do not issue rulings based on hypotheticals, and Serpe’s claim relied on a chain of future events that might never happen. While the court acknowledged that Serpe might later have a stronger case for irreparable harm (since sovereign immunity would bar him from recovering monetary damages against the FTC), such harm was purely speculative at this stage.
The court denied the injunction “without prejudice,” explicitly leaving
the door open for Serpe to raise his Seventh Amendment challenge again if the FTC were to impose a fine. As the court put it, “While the merits of Mr. Serpe’s Seventh Amendment claim may ultimately win the race, this Court will not grant extraordinary relief before the starter’s gate has even opened.”7
To prevail on his motion for a preliminary injunction, Serpe had to satisfy four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (3) that the balance of harms favors the plaintiff; and (4) that the public interest would be served.
Leibowitz found he failed to do so, particularly with respect to the showing of irreparable harm. Serpe’s suspension had already been lifted and was not currently harming his ability to train or race, undercutting claims of ongoing injury. His allegations of reputational harm and lost business were deemed too speculative and unsupported by specific evidence. And although he argued that being forced into an unconstitutional adjudication process caused irreparable harm, the court rejected this framing under 11th Circuit precedent that limits irreparable harm presumptions to certain fundamental rights, not procedural or forum-based claims.8
